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This paper studies the dual” theory of the smooth ambiguity model introduced by Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci and Mukerji (2005). Unlike the original model, we characterize the attitude toward ambiguity
captured by second-order beliefs in the dual model. First, we give a set of axioms to derive a dual
representation of the smooth ambiguity model. Second, we present a characterization of ambiguity
aversion. Last, as an application to our dual theory to a standard portfolio problem, we conduct com-
parative static predictions which give sufficient conditions to guarantee that an increase in smooth
ambiguity aversion decreases the optimal portfolio.
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1 Introduction
Many experiments provide clear evidence that the expected utility model cannot capture actual behavior
under risk and uncertainty. One of the most famous classical experiments was conducted by Ellsberg
(1961). His experiment denied that probabilistic beliefs are not used for decision making under risk
and uncertainty. Many alternatives, including Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989) and so
on, have been proposed to explain the choices in Ellsberg’s experiment. One explanation of the choices
that is consistent with the Ellsberg experiment is based on second-order beliefs, which are probabilistic
beliefs over probabilistic beliefs. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) gave a preference functional
based on this idea, named smooth ambiguity aversion. The smooth ambiguity model has an advantage
in tractability, since it is easier to apply to results in the expected utility model under circumstances with
ambiguity. Gollier (2011) presented the systematic comparative statics technique to measure the effects
of smooth ambiguity aversion. This paper develops a “dual” theory of the smooth ambiguity model,
representation, comparison and comparative statics. We note that the term dual” apparently comes from
Yaari (1986, 1987).
The dual extension of the original smooth ambiguity model has not only theoretical but also behav-
ioral contributions. The smooth ambiguity model represents the double expected utility form with respect
to first-order belief (risk) and second-order belief (uncertainty). Similarly, the dual model of the smooth
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ambiguity model also shares the analog form of the expected utility model. This basically means that ex-
perimental methods under risk can be applied to ambiguity. The cumulative prospect theory of Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) combines loss aversion with rank dependent probability. Since then, measuning
the rank dependent probability experimentally has been well developed. We note that Yaari’s dual theory
can also be seen as rank dependent probability with linear utility, so our development of the dual theory of
the smooth ambiguity model is also useful for measuring the attitude toward ambiguity experimentally.
Smooth ambiguity aversion is motivated by the descriptive viewpoint, so that the experimental applica-
tion of the dual model has an essential meaning. $A$ systematic method of comparative statics is another
contribution of this paper. By the similarity in form between the expected utility model and the smooth
ambiguity model, it is natural to apply comparative statics results from the expected utility model to the
smooth ambiguity model. Gollier (2011) developed a comparative statics method by transforming the
decision problem with ambiguity to that without ambiguity. The transformation is accomplished using
an artificial probability weighted by smooth ambiguity aversion. Unlike Gollier (2011), our method uses
second-order belief directly. We note that this tool gives another proof of Gollier’s result. We conduct
a comparative statics analysis under ambiguity applying a useful method for the expected utility model
from Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002). As in the expected utility model, this method also becomes to be
a powerful tool for comparative statics under ambiguity. The dual representation of smooth ambiguity
aversion also has merit from a theoretical viewpoint. Our results insist that smooth ambiguity aversion is
easier to analyze under the original smooth ambiguity model in some situations, but that it is much easier
to analyze under the dual model in other situations.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section introduces the notation and the set-
ting. In Section 3, we derive the dual representation of the smooth ambiguity model. In Section 4, we
characterize the notion of smooth ambiguity aversion and more smooth ambiguity aversion in our dual
theory. In Section 5, we display the effect of smooth ambiguity aversion on the portfolio choice through
comparative static analysis.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with the setting and notation for our model. The setting is essentially constructed by combining
Yaari (1987) and Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), henceforth KMM. Thus, we follow the same
notation as KMM. The state space $S=\Omega\cross(0,1]$ consists of the separable metric space, $\Omega$ , and $(0,1].$
Let $\mathscr{A}$ be the Borel $\sigma$-algebra of $\Omega,$ $\mathscr{B}_{1}$ be the Borel $\sigma$-algebra of $(0,1]$ and $\Sigma=\mathscr{A}\otimes \mathscr{B}_{1}$ . Let $f$ : $Sarrow \mathscr{C}$
be a Savage act, where $\mathscr{C}\subset \mathbb{R}$ is the set of consequences. We denote by $\succeq a$ preference over the set of
Savage acts and by $\mathscr{F}$ the set of all bounded $\Sigma$-measurable Savage acts.
Since $f\in \mathscr{F}$ , we can assume that $\mathscr{C}\subseteq[0,1]$ without loss of generality. Thus we assume that $\mathscr{C}=$
$[0,1].$
An act $1\in \mathscr{F}$ is called a lottery if
$l(\omega_{1},r)=l(\omega_{2},r)$ $\forall$ 1, $ob\in\Omega,$ $r\in(0,1],$ (1)
and is also Riemann integrable. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be the set of all such lotteries. For $f\in \mathscr{L}$ and $r\in(O, 1]$ , we define
$f(r)=f(\omega,r) \forall\omega\in\Omega.$
We assume that the following assumption that is derived by Grandmont (1972) holds.
Assumption 1 (Expected Utility on Lotteries) There exists a unique $u:\mathscr{C}arrow \mathscr{C}$, continuous, strictly
increasing, and normalized so that $u(O)=0$ and $u(1)=1$ such that
$f \succeq g\Leftrightarrow\int_{(0,1]}u(f(r))dr\geq\int_{(0,1]}u(g(r))dr \forall f,g\in \mathscr{L}.$
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Let $\pi:\Sigmaarrow[0,1]$ be a probability measure satisfying
$\pi(A\cross B)=\pi(A\cross(0,1])\lambda(B) \forall A\in \mathscr{A}, B\in \mathscr{B}_{1}$ , (2)
where $\lambda$ : $\mathscr{B}_{1}arrow[0,1]$ is the Lebesgue measure. Let $\Delta$ denote the set of all such probability measures.
Let $\mathscr{C}(S)$ denote the set of all continuous and bounded real-valued functions on $S.$
Definition 1 $A$ second-order act is any bounded $\sigma(\Delta)$ -measurablefunction $f:\Deltaarrow \mathscr{C}.$
Let $\mathfrak{F}$ be the set of all second-order acts and $\succeq^{2}$ be the preference ordering on $\mathfrak{F}.$
Assumption2 (Subjective Expected Utmty on Second Order Acts) There exists a probability mea-
sure $\mu:\sigma(\Delta)arrow[0,1];0<\mu(J)<1\forall J\in\sigma(\Delta)$ , and a continuous, snictly increasingfunction $v:\mathscr{C}arrow \mathbb{R}$
such that
$f\succeq^{2}\mathfrak{g}\Leftrightarrow\int_{\Delta}v(f(\pi))d\mu\geq\int_{\Delta}v(\mathfrak{g}(\pi))d\mu \forall f,\mathfrak{g}\in \mathfrak{F}.$
As to the necessary and sufficient conditions such that the above assumption holds, we can refer to, e,g.,
Theorem 10.3 of Fishburn (1982).
For each $f\in \mathfrak{F},$
$G_{f}(t):=\mu(f(\pi)>t) , t\in[O, 1].$
Axiom 1 (Neutrality) For each $f,\mathfrak{g}\in \mathfrak{F}$ , if $G_{f}=G_{g}$ , then $f\sim^{2}\mathfrak{g}.$
$\Gamma=$ {$G:[0,1]arrow[0,1]|G$ is nonincreasing, right-continuous and $G(1)=0$}.
From Axiom 1, the preference relation $\succeq^{2}$ on $\Gamma$ is consmlcted by
$G=G_{f}\succeq^{2}H=G_{\mathfrak{g}}\Leftrightarrow f\succeq^{2}\mathfrak{g},$
for $G,H\in\Gamma$ and $f,\mathfrak{g}\in \mathfrak{F}.$
For each $G\in\Gamma$ and each $t\in[O, 1]$ , let $\hat{G}(t)$ be defined by
$\hat{G}(t)=\{x|G(t)\leq x\leq G(t-)\}.$
We define the inverse of $G$ by
$G^{-1}(p)= \min\{t|p\in\hat{G}(t)\}.$
We note that $G^{-1}\in\Gamma$ and that $(G^{-1})^{-1}=G.$
We define a mixture of functions contained in $\Gamma$ . For each $G,H\in\Gamma$ and $\alpha\in[0,1]$
$\alpha G$ ffl $(1-\alpha)H:=(\alpha G^{-1}+(1-\alpha)H^{-1})^{-1}$ (3)
Axiom 2 (Dual Independence) If $G,G’,H\in\Gamma$ and $\alpha\in[0,1]$ , then
$G\succeq^{2}G’\Rightarrow\alpha G$ffl $(1-\alpha)H\succeq^{2}\alpha G’$ ee $(1-\alpha)H.$
We have the following lemma.
Lemma $1\succeq^{2}$ satisfies Assumption2 and Axioms 1-2 if and only if there exists a continuous strictly
increasingfunction $\varphi:[0,1]arrow[0,1]$ such that
$f\succeq^{2}\mathfrak{g}\Leftrightarrow\int_{(0,1]}\varphi(G_{f}(t))dJ\geq\int_{(0,1]}\varphi(G_{\mathfrak{g}}(t))dJ \forall f,\mathfrak{g}\in \mathfrak{F}.$
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Let $\pi_{f}$ : $\mathscr{B}_{1}arrow[0,1]$ be defined by
$\pi_{f}(B)=\pi(f^{-1}(B)) \forall B\in \mathscr{B}_{1}.$
Lemma 2 For all $f\in \mathscr{F}$ and $\pi\in\Delta$, there exists a non-decreasing lottery act $l_{f}(\pi)\in \mathscr{L}$ such that
$\lambda(l_{f}(\pi)\in B)=\pi_{f}(B) \forall B\in \mathscr{B}_{1}.$
Let $\delta_{X}$ be the constant act for $x\in \mathscr{C}$ . Let $c_{f}(\pi)$ denote the certainty equivalent of the lottery act $l_{f}(\pi)$
such that $\delta_{c_{f}(\pi)}\sim l_{f}(\pi)$ .
Demtion $2Gi\nu enf\in \mathscr{F},$ $f^{2}\in \mathfrak{F}$ is a second-order act associated with $f$ if
$f^{2}(\pi)=u(c_{f}(\pi)) \forall\pi\in\Delta.$




Theorem 1 presents the dual theory of the smooth ambiguity model.
Theorem 1 Given Assumptions 1 and 2 andAxioms $1- 5,$ $\succeq is$ represented by $V:\mathscr{F}arrow \mathbb{R},$
$V(f)= \int_{0}^{1}\varphi[G_{u^{\pi}(f)}(t)]dt$ , (4)
where
$u^{\pi}(f):\Piarrow \mathscr{C}$ ; $u^{\pi}(f)= \int_{S}u(f(s))d\pi(s)$ .
If we define $F_{u^{\pi}(f)}^{\varphi}(t)=1-\varphi[G_{u^{\pi}(f)}(t)]$ , then integration by parts allows us to rewnite (4) as
$V(f)= \int_{0}^{1}tdF_{u^{\pi}(f)}^{\varphi}(t)$. (5)
Since $F_{u^{\pi}(f)}^{\varphi}$ is a cumulative distribution function of $u^{\pi}(f)$ , we can consider a probability measure $\mu^{\varphi}$
over $\Delta$ induced by $F_{u^{\pi}(f)}^{\varphi}$ . Hence we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Let $\mathbb{E}_{\mu}^{\varphi}$ denote the expectation under the probability measure $\mu^{\varphi}$ . Under the same assump-
tions and axioms as Theorem 1, thefunctional $V$ : $\mathscr{F}arrow \mathbb{R}$ is represented by
$V(f)= \mathbb{E}_{\mu}^{\varphi}[\int u(f(s))d\pi(s)]=\mathbb{E}^{\varphi}[u\circ f]$ , (6)
where $\mathbb{E}^{\varphi}$ denotes the expectation under the probability measure defined by
$\mathbb{E}_{\mu}^{\varphi}[\mathbb{E}_{\pi}[1_{A\cross B}]] \forall A\in \mathscr{A}, B\in \mathscr{B}_{1}.$
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4 Ambiguity Attitude
Let $\mu_{f}$ be the induced distribution defined by
$\mu_{f}(u(B))=\mu((f^{2})^{-1}(B)) \forall B\in \mathscr{B}_{1}.$
We denote by $\Pi$ the support of $\mu$ . In addition to the earlier assumptions, we impose the following
assumption in order to discuss ambiguity attitude of decision makers.
Assumption 4 Fix a family ofpreference relationships $\{\succ\Pi, \succ_{\Pi}^{2}\}_{\Pi\subseteq\Delta}$ for a given decision maker. Both
the restriction of $\succ\Pi$ to lottery acts and the risk preferences derived$from\succ_{\Pi}^{2}$ remain the samefor every
$\Pi\subseteq\Delta.$
This assumption guarantees that the same $\varphi$ may be used to represent each $\succ\Pi$ for a decision maker as
the support of her subjective belief varies.
According to KMM, smooth ambiguity aversion is defined as follows.




and $\mu$ has a support $\Pi.$ $ADM$ displays smooth ambiguity aversion if she displays smooth ambiguity
aversion at $(f,\Pi)$ for all $f\in \mathscr{F}$ and all supports $\Pi\subseteq\Delta.$
Proposition 1 UnderAssumptions 1-3, the following conditions are equivalent.$\cdot$
$(a)$ Thefunction $\varphi:[0,1]arrow[0,1]$ is convex.
$(b)$ The $DM$ displays smooth ambiguity $a\nu$ersion.
Let $A$ and $B$ be two DMs whose families of preferences share the same probability measure $\mu\Pi$ for
each support $\Pi$ . According to KMM, we define the statement“$A$ is more ambiguity averse than $B$” as
follows.
Definition 4 $A$ is more ambiguity averse than $B$ if
$f\succeq_{\Pi}^{A}l\Rightarrow f\succeq_{\Pi}^{B}l \forall f\in \mathscr{F}, l\in \mathscr{L}, \Pi\in\Delta$ . (7)
Theorem 2 $LetA$ and $B$ be two $DMs$ whose families ofpreferences share the same probability measure
$\mu\Pi$ for each support $\Pi$. Then $A$ is more ambiguity averse than $B$ if and only if they share the same (von
Neumman-Morgenstern) utilityfunction $u$ and
$\varphi_{A}=h\circ\varphi_{B}$
for some strictly increasing, continuous and convex $h:[0,1]arrow[0,1].$
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5 Application to the Portfolio Problem and Comparative Statics
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we apply the dual theory of the smooth ambiguity model to the simple portfolio problem
consisting of one risk-free asset and one risky asset. The risk-free rate of remm is nonnalized to zero
without loss of generality. The risky asset remm is ambiguous in the sense that its remm is indexed by
$\theta\in\Theta=[0,1]$ . We assume that the investor’s belief over $\Theta$ is represented by a decumulative function
$G(\theta)$ . The excess retum of the risky asset indexed by $\theta$ is denoted by $\tilde{x}(\theta)$ . To avoid technical difficulties,
we assume that $\tilde{x}(\theta)$ takes a value in a bounded interval. Given an endowment wealth $w$, the investor
chooses the share $\alpha$ of the risky asset. Then she receives the (conditional) expected utility $U(\alpha, \theta)=$
$E_{\theta}[u(w+\alpha\tilde{x}(\theta))]$ . Here $u$ is the (von Neumman-Morgenstem) utility function which is assumed to be
increasing and concave, and $\mathbb{E}_{\theta}$ denotes the conditional expectation given by $\theta.$
We also assume that the expected utility $U(\alpha, \theta)$ is ranked by ascending order in $\theta$ . In other words,
the excess asset retum is ranked by the first- $and\int or$ the second-order stochastic dominance for $\alpha>0.$
By this assumption, there exists $\theta^{*}(\alpha,t)\in\Theta$ such that $U(\alpha, \theta^{*}(\alpha,t))=t$ for each $t\in[O, 1]$ . Then, from
Theorem 1, the investor computes the welfare $V(\alpha)$ through the transformation function $\varphi$ :
$V( \alpha)=\int_{0}^{1}\varphi[G(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))]dt$ , (8)
where $\varphi$ is increasing and satisfies $\varphi(0)=0$ and $\varphi(1)=1$ . From Proposition 1 the smooth ambiguity
aversion is captured by the convexity of $\varphi$ . In this representation, comparison of smooth ambiguity
aversion is defined as follows: if $\varphi_{2}$ is more smoothly ambiguity averse thm $\varphi_{1}$ , then there exists an
increasing, convex transformation function $h$ such that $\varphi_{2}=h\circ\varphi_{1}.$
At first, we confirm that the $sign$ of the risky asset holding coincides with that of the expectation of
the risky asset if the signs of $\mathbb{E}_{\theta}[\tilde{x}(\theta)]$ are the same for all $\theta\in\Theta$ . The first-order condition is given by
$V’( \alpha)=\int_{0}^{1}\varphi’(G(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))G’(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))\frac{\partial\theta^{*}(\alpha,t)}{\partial\alpha}dt=0.$ (9)
For each $t\in[O, 1]$ , totally differentiating $U(\alpha, \theta)$ gives
$\frac{\partial\theta^{*}(\alpha,t)}{\partial\alpha}|_{\alpha=0} = -\frac{E_{\theta}[u’(w+\alpha\tilde{x}(\theta))\tilde{x}(\theta)]}{\partial U(\alpha,\theta)/\partial\theta}|_{\alpha=0}$
$= - \frac{u’(w)\mathbb{E}_{\theta}[\tilde{x}(\theta)]}{\partial U(\alpha,\theta)/\partial\theta|_{\alpha=0}}.$
Since $\varphi’(\cdot)G’(\cdot)\leq 0$, by the concavity of the objective function, the following relation holds:
$\mathbb{E}_{\theta}[\tilde{x}(\theta)]\geq(\leq)0\Rightarrow\alpha^{*}\geq(\leq)0$. (10)
In the remainder of this section, we assume that $\mathbb{E}_{\theta}[\tilde{x}(\theta)]$ is positive for each $\theta\in\Theta$ , that is, the risky
asset holding is positive. We obtain similar results by changing the $sign$ for the case when the risky asset
holding is negative. Thus we omit them.
5.2 Two indexes case
In this subsection, we consider a simple case in which the set of indexes $\Theta$ consists of two elements
$\{0,1\}$ . The investor believes that $\theta=0$ and that $\theta=1$ are given by $1-p$ and $p$ respectively. The
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excess risky asset retums indexed by them are given by $\tilde{x}_{0}=\tilde{x}(0)$ and $\tilde{x}_{1}=x(1)$ respectively. We assume
that $\tilde{x}_{1}$ dominates $\tilde{x}_{0}$ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD), so that $\mathbb{E}[u(w+\alpha\tilde{x}_{0})]\leq$
$\mathbb{E}[u(w+\alpha x_{1})]$ for any $\alpha>0$ . In this setting, the investor maximizes the welfare:
$\max_{\alpha}(1-\varphi(p))\mathbb{E}[u(w+\alpha\tilde{x}_{0})]+\varphi(p)E[u(w+\alpha\tilde{x}_{1})]$ . (11)
The first-order condition is given by $\alpha=\alpha^{*}$ satisfying
$(1-\varphi(p))\mathbb{E}[u’(w+\alpha^{*}\tilde{x}_{0})\tilde{x}_{0}]+\varphi(p)\mathbb{E}[u’(w+\alpha^{*}\tilde{x}_{1})\tilde{x}_{1}]=0$ . (12)
The second-order condition is also satisfied by the concavity of the utility function. We examine the
effect of increasing smooth ambiguity aversion on the optimal portfolio in our dual theory.
Let an investor with her transformation function $\varphi_{1}$ be more ambiguity averse than an investor with
her transformation function $\varphi_{2}$ . From Theorem 2, we can readily observe that $\varphi_{2}(p)>\varphi_{1}(p)$ . It is
natural to conjecture that an increase in smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the holding of the risky
asset. However, as illustrated by Gollier (2011) for the original smooth ambiguity model, this does not
hold.
Proposition2 In the two indexes case, if the investor has the preference that her relative risk aversion
is less than unity, an increase in smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the share of the risky asset.
We note that if the investor’s relative risk aversion is not less than unity, it may be possible that
an increase in smooth ambiguity aversion increases the share of the risky asset since it may occur that
$\infty>\alpha_{1}$ as shown in an example of a quadratic utility function in Fishburn and Porter (1976).
5.3 The general case
In this subsection, we consider a general case in which the set of indexes is defined by the interval
$\Theta=[0,1]$ . Let an investor with transformation function $\varphi_{1}$ be more ambiguity averse than an investor
with transformation function $\varphi_{2}$ . The optimal portfolio of the risky asset for the investor with $\varphi_{1}$ is given
by the following first-order condition:
$V_{1}’( \alpha)=\int_{0}^{1}\varphi_{1}’(G(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))G’(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))\frac{\partial\theta^{*}(\alpha,r)}{\partial\alpha}dt=0$ . (13)
To determine a condition such that an increase in smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the optimal
portfolio of the risky asset, we have to find a condition that satisfies the following inequality:
$V_{2}’( \alpha)=\int_{0}^{1}\varphi_{2}’(G(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))G’(\theta^{*}(\alpha,t))\frac{\partial\theta^{*}(\alpha,t)}{\partial\alpha}dx\geq 0$ . (14)
To prove this inequality, we use the variation diminishing property introduced by Karlin and Novikoff
(1963) and Karlin (1968). Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002) have discussed its economic and financial
applications.
Property 1 Suppose that $g$ : $\mathbb{R}arrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfies the single crossing condition that there exists a $x_{0}\in \mathbb{R}$
satisfying $(x-x_{0})g(x)\geq 0$ for all $x\in \mathbb{R}$. Then the following two conditions are equivalent.$\cdot$. $\phi$ : $\mathbb{R}^{2}arrow \mathbb{R}$ is $log$-supermodular (LSPM).. $\mathbb{E}[g(x)\phi(x, \theta_{L})]=0\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[g(x)\phi(x, \theta_{H})]\geq 0$ $\forall\theta_{H}\geq\theta_{L}.$
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To use this property, we begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose $\phi$ : $\mathbb{R}^{2}arrow \mathbb{R}^{+}$ is differentiable with respect to its first argument. Then $\phi$ is LSPM if
and only if $\frac{\partial\phi(x,y)/\partial x}{\phi(x,y)}$ is non-decreasing in $y.$
Proposition 3 Suppose that an irtvestor follows the dual theory of smooth ambiguity aversion. An in-
crease in smooth ambiguity aversion reduces the optimal share of the risky asset if
$g(t)=G’( \theta^{*}(\alpha,t))\frac{\partial\theta^{*}(\alpha,t)}{\partial\alpha}$
has the single crossing property at $t_{0};(t-t_{0})g(t)\geq 0.$
Theorem 3 Suppose that an investor follows the dual theory of smooth ambiguity aversion. If the in-
vestor has the preference that her relative risk aversion is less than unity and the risky asset retums are
ranked byfirst-order stochastic dominance, then an increase in smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the
share of the risky asset.
Theorem 4 Suppose that an investor follows the dual theory of smooth ambiguity aversion. If the in-
vestor has the preference that her relative prudence is greater than zero and less than two and the risky
asset returns are ranked by the second-order stochastic dominance, an increase in smooth ambiguity
aversion decreases the share of the risky asset.
A similar theorem holds for central dominance, which is necessary and sufficient for increasing the
share of the risky asset for all risk averse investors. In addition, a similar theorem also holds for any
stochastic dominance that is stronger than central dominance. See Chapter 6 in Gollier (2001) for an
explanation of central dominance and the related stochastic dominance.
Theorem 5 Suppose that an investorfollows the dual theory ofsmooth ambiguity aversion. An increase
in smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the share of the risky asset when the risky asset returns are
ranked by central dominance.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the dual theory of the smooth ambiguity model introduced by KMM. This can be
viewed as an extension of Yaari’s dual theory of the expected utility model for ambiguity. In our dual
theory, the preferences for ambiguity capmre second-order beliefs. Adding some axioms to the original
model, we present the preference functional for the dual representation of the smooth ambiguity model.
We characterized ambiguity aversion and its comparison in our dual theory. Lastly, we determined a set
of sufficient conditions that guarantee that smooth ambiguity aversion decreases the optimal portfoho in
an application of our model to the standard portfolio problem.
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